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were involved.

While of great value, memoirs and oral
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the interviewee and not the official opinion of the U.S. Air
Force Historical Program or of the Department of the Air
Force.

The Air Force has not verified the statements contained
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on magnetic tape.

Editorial notes and additions made by U.S.

Air Force historians have been enclosed in brackets.

When

feasible, first names, ranks, or titles have been provided.
Only minor changes for the sake of clarity were made before
the transcript was returned to the interviewee for final
editing and approval.

Readers must therefore remember that

this is a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written,
word.
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Major General Edward Lansdale

25 April 1971

Q:

Gen Lansdale, would you tell us how you first b e came
involved in military affairs? What was your direc tion
that brought you into the Army, and what were you doing when
you first joined the Army?
A:

I was in an advertising agency in San Francisco when
World War II started.
I was really past the age of being
drafted, and especially since I had children, and both
status and age were keeping me out. But, I wanted to do
something to help the country in the war, I tried to get

involved in some type of service, I started off initially
with the Office of Strategic Services as an intelligence
collector for them, and after working at that for a time,
I was picked up also by the Military Intelligence Service
of the U. S. Army.
For a time after as a civilian during
the war, I was working for both O.S.S. and M.I.S.
I was
told at one time by Wild Bill Donovan, who was head of
the O.S.S., that I was the only individual so employed by
both services at the same time.
There was an amount of
rivalry between them.

But in 1943, the M.I.S. wanted me to
spend most of my time serving them so I was commissioned
as a first lieutenant.

I'd been a reserve officer yea r s
before, out of college ROTC, but had resigned.
They picked
up my old commission finally in 1943 and renewed it as a
first li e utenant. From then on I was serv i ng for M.I.S.
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Q:

What was the nature of the intelligence community when

you first got involved with it?

Was it sort of a makeshift

operation or had they really had firm plans for how they
were going to gather their intelligence?
A:

Well they had many plans of course on how they were

to gather intelligence, but I don't think the United States
was really ready for a global conflict such as World War II
and the needs of the conflict in the way of very basic
information in geography terrain maps, man-made features on
the terrain, the people involved, the vast and hitherto
h

almost unknown places were we were putting forces.

'

This put

a tremendous demand on the United States to come up with
information to be used by top headquarters and in theater
commands.

Part of the work was almost like being an editor

of the National Geographic Magazine in that we collected
photog raphs of not only airstrips and beaches for landings
but also roads and bridges and more pedestrian types of
geographic information.

We also went into details on people

who lived in places, their potentials for helping our
troops, potentials for collecting information about Japanese,
about Germans, and so on.
Q:

This information gathering, did you just start with one

piece of information and then say, we could use a little
more about this area, and just start growing and growing as
you became more involved and discovered that there were
things you could find out that would be useful?
A:

There were known gaps in information.

All of the
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intelligence services of the military and the O.S.S. at the
time had priorities on what they needed to know.

Then they

would list the gaps of the information by countries and by
subject areas so that in effect, there was a very large
gazette listing unknown but desired information.
try to get this information from people.

We would

I interviewed folks

who had been in foreign areas, such as scientists, geologists,
ichthyologists, and others. We would sort of mentally take
them through their experiences in these countries to not only
cover their own subject areas, but also tell us about the
people they knew and the conditions as they were when last
seen and so on. For example, one of them was a person like
Bailey Willis, who was the professor emeritus of geology at
Stanford University. He was the only American we knew who
had been in Okinawa when the Japanese were holding it as a
mandate. He had talked the Japanese Imperial Navy into
letting him go there as a geologist just before World War II
started.

He had walked through the territory and knew it.
Well a person such as Willis would just be invaluable,
not only to describe the terrain, but also to say whether
the Japs had done this or that.
Did you see any defenses?
What are the harbors like?

The beaches?

Would the people

be going along with the Japanese or would they resist if
given the chance? Many questions immediately spring to
mind, so that in talking with a person such as that, you'd
have a map out and be filling in any details that you didn't
have.

You'd have your aerial photos and be doing, in effect,

photo interpretation:

What the hell is that square thing

there or the squiggly thing or whatever?
and fill you in on the details.

He'd usually know

Aside from that, given the

Lansdale - 4

nature of the conflict, you'd say, where else have you been?
And then you'd quickly discover that a person such as that
had been up in the Sing Ling Shan Mountains of China, had
done surveys in many other places.

One thing I picked up

information for the Navy from Bailey Willis not only about
the Pacific Ocean, the Pacific Basin which he knew very
well, but places like the Sargasso Sea.

He had many clues

that would help locate submarine refueling spots in the
ocean that could be passed very quickly to the Office of
Naval Intelligence.

Each individual, in effect, was a gold

mine if the interviewer was a good miner and knew how to
go after such things.
Q:

During World War II you had occasion to visit with

tribal groups on occasion.

Would you describe how this

came about and the effect.
A:

The Indonesians, the Sumatrans from Indonesia, were

the sailors of Indonesia and had gone aboard Dutch ships
which were helping the Allied effort in all oceans,
particularly their merchant ships, transports, freighters,
to back up our war effort.

The Office of Naval Intelligence

and the British at one point got word that the Indonesian
seamen aboard these Dutch ships had heard Queen Wilhelmina's
broadcast of her support of the Declaration of the Four
Freedoms by Roosevelt and Churchill.

Hearing this, they

decided that they too were part of the four freedoms and
they were all going to quit and go home and have their own
freedom in Indonesia.

This was at the time the Japanese

were just coming down into Indonesia and proclaiming it
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independent and forcing Indonesia into their Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
The Navy didn't have enough
exact information on how many of the sailors were ready to
strike, to desert, and so on.
I was asked to help in this
since I seemed to get along very well with Asians in the
work that I had done.

I managed to meet various of the
Indonesian seamen in port and I had drinking bouts with

them and at one of these I was rather exuberantly made a
member of the Batok tribe of Sumatra. The Batoks, among
the seamen, from then on kept me very well advised on what
their plans were and also listened to me as I talked them
out of having a strike and to continue on in the war
effort until the day of victory when they could realize
the four freedoms at that time. This type of working with
tribes also extended to various European groups.
I
remember that I got in with a number of Andalusian
emigrants who were against the Axis tie-in with Franco and
who were willing to help the Allied effort. Also any
place abroad where there were Andalusians, I got into
correspondance with them to h e •lp our effort.
Perhaps
these Andalusians had been sheep-herders at home, but as
they left home and went abroad they became laborers or
menials in households. We suddenly had a whole group of
chauffeurs and house boys and gardeners situated next
to very significant and prominent leaders of various nations,
such as ambassadors and consul generals and so forth around
the world, whose households were suddenly no longer safe for
secrets.

This made a considerable network at the time.
This was years ago and I forget what all I was doing a nd
what networks I set up.
I would do the original rec r uiting
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and setting them up but I wouldn't run them too much.
They
kept using me to go out getting new informatio n and meet new
people all the time, which seemed to be my forte.
Q:

Yau said you had contacts with the agents.
Is there
any reason, do you think, looking back, why you were able
to communica te or be effective with the agents?

A:

I don't know what it was, except that to me people
have always been people, and an individual has always been
an individual regardless of the color of his skin or his
race or his language.

I have puzzled about this a great deal in my life,
Asians have told me that I had alwayE dealt with and had
given them their dignity when I dealt with them.
They said
that it was rare that a person would see them as real human
beings.
To me there has never been anything else but that.
I grew up in California , in a place where the Asians
were a minority that had a very rough time. And I presume
not having joined in with the majority's denigratio n of the
minority, and having known a number of Japanese and Philippino s
when I was in school, along with Mexicans and all the rest
of the minority groups in California , and still treating
them as individua ls, this helped.
But I don't know what it is, I really don't.

Q:

Are you linguistic ally able to.

A:

No, not at all.

I have a very bad ear for languages,
and I have a very bad tongue for them.
But having spent
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many years among foreign people who don't know English and
only picking up a few rudiments of a foreign language, I've
had to depend a great deal on a look of empathy, a physical
look, and an ability to try to communica te without words -acting out things, and somehow or other getting the touch
of one human being with another.
I don't know what you
would call it, but people respond to smiles, to an interest
in their well being, even if you can't speak their way.
If
you've got a look that somehow or other they can read, why
you can communica te with them.
I remember once in the Philippine s I spent hours with
a Negrito, who was the president of a tribe living just
beyond the bombing range on Clark Air Force Base.
This was
in 1945, just at the end of the war, I was trying to find
out what had happened to the remnants of a Japanese armored
column that had gone up in the hills. This president with
some of his tribal men showed up at my camp.
I cooked them
up a dinner.
His one word of English was Okay, and I knew
two or three words from a little handbook I had of Tagalog.
But, he didn't know Tagalog.
So we had a time in trying to
talk to each other. This problem was finally solved by each
of us drawing pictures in the sand and by acting out parts.
I finally ga thered that Americans had done something to his
daughter, and very specifical ly he showed me that the Americans
had done it to his daughter's belly. So I figured that some
GI had wondered up there, (and mind you, the Negritos are
only about 3 to 4 feet high, pygmies), some GI must have
really been hungry for a girl, and had done whatever had
happened to his daughter. But after three or four hours
of talk he started shaking his head, that his daughter
wasn't pregnant, and this wasn't the trouble, there was
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something else.

Finally, after hours of laboriously trying
to communicate, I discovered that Americans had set up 155
artillery, and had been killing this Japanese armored
column that was going to get up into the Zamrales range and
get away from the 155s. He had been caught up in the draw
there, and his daughter had been out getting vegetables, and
a 155 went right through her belly, and she had been killed.
With that I took off my GI watch that I had, and I strapped
it on the wrist of the tribal president, as an expression of
an American's sympathy about his daughter.

He seemed pleased.

I showed him how to wind the watch and how to listen to
it. He didn't know how to tell time, but I showed him, and
every time the sun went down he would wind the watch each
day, so it would run for 24 hours.
still has the watch up there.

I have a hunch that he

I went up some years afterwards to the range, during
the Huk Campaign.
I could never find the same particular group, the same
tribal group. But I ran across others, and they had all
heard about this watch.
It was all over the mountain range
about this American who had given the watch to the person
whose daughter had been killed by the artillery.
I presume , an art of communication.

This is,

At times I have had Americans or others with me as
interpreters who were almost bilingual, or at least were
rated excellent from a language school, and yet their empathy
was flat.
Some of them had picked up the manners of
instructors or others, an outward show of superiority
towards "natives". They were able to use the language far
more readily than I ever was, and yet their manner caused
people to freeze up.

They lacked friendliness or something.
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This quality would almost immediately be felt by these
people who would react by becoming ultra cautious or
circumspect in what they said.
I recall another case.

Around

1

66 or '67, I was up

near Danang taking a look at the Marine Corps pacification
campaign in Vietnam -- a very excellent campaign that they
were doing.
I accompanied one of the Marine Corps generals who
invited me to go through a village with him. He had his
staff along, and walking through the village, the Marines
followed their handbook on this very same point of communicating
with the natives.
In parade ground voices they would shout
"chao ong," which means hello.
The villagers would be looking out of the doors and
windows of the doors and windows of their huts.
I'm sure
the Marines didn't realize what "big" voices they had to the
ears of the villagers.

In turn you could just see the villagers

taking in their breath to shout that same word back to these
Marines, figuring that shouting must b.e an American habit.
There was communication going on, but on seeing the
villagers breathing in deeply in order to be able to yell
back, the situation tickled my funnybone.

I got to grinning.

Seeing me finding this situation as funny as apparently
they did too, they started grinning back at me.

Then some

came out of their houses and started walking along with me
to watch other villagers in the street take in big breaths
for the exchange of shouted hellos with the Marines. As
with most simple comedy, the repetition got funnier as we
walked along.
Finally we got to the end of the village.

The Marine
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Corps general looked around, and here I was with all the
villagers, and we were all laughing, and walking along,
and he said, "How did you do it?" I asked, "How did I
do what?"

He said, "You haven't spoken a single word, and
yet you've got all the villagers with you.
Something is
funny -- what are you laughing at?" And I said, "I
really don't want to tell you .

We just found something

funny here among ourselves, and this is the way we speak
or communicate with each other."
Whatever it is, it's a quality of seizing a moment of
life, maybe, and sharing it with people.
It's seeing
them as humans, and I couldn't have done it in this
particular case, which I hadn't thought about at all,
unless I had seen them as being hun,an and having a sense
of humor, the whole bit -- sharing just a moment of fun
with them.
Q:

Could you tell us something about the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines, and how you became involved
in the program?
A:

I went into the Philippines actually as an intelligence
officer for the invasion of Japan.
I got in right at the
end of the liberation of the Philippines -- they were
finishing up that campaign and starting to get ready for
the main Japanese islands.
The war ended.
time on my hands.

I found that I had considerable free

I was a major at the time, and nobody
quite knew what to do with me.
I managed to find myself a
jeep, and I took off and started driving around, (there
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are some very beautiful places in the Philippines) and
seeing what was going on, once in a while helping out as
there would be a small Japanese unit still running around
up in the boondocks, joining in with the infantry, ours
and the local Filipinos, trying to locate these guys, and
either get them to surrender, or often we didn't ask them
to surrender, we just took care of them on the spot.
Then I was assigned to the G-2 staff of AFWESPAC
(Armed Forces, Western Pacific), where I formed a "positive
intelligence" staff section for the G-2 -- Col Bishop at
the time -- that would collect current information about
the conditions in the command's area of responsibility,
particularly the Philippines.

My staff section was called

the Intelligence Division.
Later I carried out explorations of the Ryukyus
islands north of Okinawa, at war's end, gathering current
information for use by military government or whatever
custodianship might be set up for that remote area.
I commandeered a small Japanese fishing boat in Okinawa,
with its crew.

Then, with three enlisted men and myself

aboard, we went all through the northern Ryukyus, visiting
each island.

I talked to the people and learned of the

conditions there

--

the condition of crops, the living

conditions of the people, harbors, about landing places,
roads and how the Japanese military were getting out at
the time, and what we might have to contend with as a
military government eventually.
The AFWESPAC area was large.

I didn't get down to

Indonesia at the time, or down to New Guinea at all, but
I did manage to get to many of the islands in the Philippines.
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Mind you, there are 7000 islands there, and it kept me
very busy getting around places.
I'd go by air and sea and overland, and I got to know
the Philippines quite well.
I had discovered the many bands of dissidents on the
island of which the Huks were only one.
There were large
bandit groups at the time who picked up weapons on the
battle field or had weapons and had discovered a far easier
way to make a living with a gun than having to work for it.
Finally we did a survey, I had my staff do a survey, of
conditions throughout the Philippines that wound up in
about 14 compendium type of reports to the U.S. government.
They told of conditions, economic and social and law and
order or security type conditions throughout the Philippines.
In 1946 as the Philippines was trying to figure out how
they were going to be able to handle independance, my
reports were just being completed by my staff and myself.
I asked permission of the U.S. government to let me give
them to the Philippine government, which they did.
These
reports became the subject of Philippine cabinet deliberation
and also were used as sort of starting studies by the U.S.
War Damage Commission and many other U.S. groups that were
starting up economic aid and other help to the Philippines,
at the end of the war.
Q:

Sir, from your observations, what was the Japanese

Occupation like?

It seemed like initially the greater

Southeast Asian CO-Prosperity spirit might have been a
very popular thing with some of the Asian people.
A:

It was a popular thing for the ambitious Asians which
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the Japanese were very much aware of and would exploit
be getting close to the more ambitious political figures
in Asia, the Philippines and elsewhere and giving them
a chance to be president or cabinet minister or to advance
politically.

This of course was very gratifying to the
Asians to be given that chance. Then in the Philippines
a rather unique thing happened.
In trying to find out what
it was, and this incidentally is in my book, the Philippine
politicians that I talked to and the Philippine resistance
leaders who were friends of mine were frequently put on
the spot by me in trying to find out why they behaved
differently at a moment when the United States had been
defeated in the Philippines. They were left on their own,
the Japanese were in their midst, with a very alluring
promise of "you can go it on your own". Whether they were
believed or not would be a factor.
Whether there were any
feelings of loyalty to the United States was a factor and
so on.

I tried very hard.

Why was there so much resistance
in the Philippines to the Japanese? Almost all of them
told me a story and I don't know whether it's a true story
or not, but I take it as the truth because the Filipinos
believed it to the point of risking the ir lives in the
belief that it was true. They all told me, and I heard
this from many different sources, about an incident in the
last days of Corregidor, before President Quezon and
General MacArthur left Corregidor and went down to
Australia, in the days when things looked very bleak.
(The U.S. forces in Luzon had been driven back into Bataan
and onto Corregidor, the Japanese had put their armed forces
throughout the islands and had taken all of the main cities
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and all of the main harbors and ports and so forth.)
Quezon used the Corregidor radio to radio to send a
message to President Roosevelt. Quezon pointed out that
they had had an honorable agreement getween the Philippine
Commonwea lth and the U.S., a pact of common defense, in
which they would be side by side against a common enemy.
But the common enemy, the Japanese, had invaded the
Philippine s, were occupying most of it, and had, through
bombing, artillery, and infantry brought great desolation
to the Philippine s. The people were under the guns and
bayonets of an enemy.

Quezon, as President of the Commonwealth , felt that the time had come when he had to make a
decision about continuing on with the agreement with the
U.S. to defend the Philippine s. He said that if he
continued it, it would only bring increasing suffering to
his people. Reluctantl y, as the leader of his people, he
felt that he should ask now to be relieved of h i s promise
to continue fighting with the Americans , now that the
battle was practicall y over and they had lost.
I've never
seen the message back from the White House, but it's
gospel truth to all the Filipinos who then risked their
lives after that.
They said a message came back, signed
by Roosevelt, that said that we understood the conditions
in the Philippine s and we Americans also didn't want the

•'

Filipinos to su f fer the consequenc es of the defense of that
country; however, we Americans had promised to d e fend the
Philippine s and as long as one American was left alive,
we were going to stick with our promise. We would try to
do our best to help them and wouldn't go back on our promise
but Quezon was free to do what he wanted.
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Well, the Filipinos are very sentimental and emotional.
Word of this, that the Americans as long as one American
was left alive, would be true to their word, would still
try to defend and help the Philippines, got out throughout
the Philippine islands.

When the Filipinos heard this,

they thought, "Well, think of the shame if we stop ourselves
now! Here are people who really aren't of us, but are
dying while trying to defend us.

They're sticking to

their word, so we've got to keep going too."
was what they tried to do in the war.

And this

The occupation of

the Philippines by the Japanese had to change its character
because of this.
The Japanese were plagued from then on
with guerrilla raids, by insurrections, by all sorts of
troubles, sabotage continuously, slowdowns from work and
all types of things that are very hard to put a finger on
but which made Japanese tenure in the islands most difficult.
I say it was a unique thing because the same type of thing
didn't happen in any of the other places the Japanese
occupied .

They got along much better . with many other people

than they ever did in the Philippines.

They had a very

difficult and continuing task during the entire war in
keeping the Philippines pacified enough for them to carry
out their military work there. This was mostly as a support
base for vari ous operations further on.

They had naval

bases there, air bas es , supply dumps, and what not.

The

Japanese, all during the occupation of the Philippines,
had a rough time of it.

Their political police -- the

Kempetai -- devised methods of population control.

One

was a ''neighborhood association" in which people were
supposed to inform on neighbors, with penalties for not
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doing so, and with leading citizens being held responsible
sort of as hostages to the state. Not too unlike the
totalitarian measures of Nazi occupation in Europe.
But none of this was really successful during the
war, because the population largely remained loyal to
Americans and to the Filipinos who were resisting the
Japanese (as the friends of the Americans in this war.)
Q:

Sir, Emilio Aguinaldo became in the eyes of some a
collaborator, although he claims that he was doing it to
modify the effects of occupation. What is your feeling
about his role during the Second World War and the occupation?
A:

He, and a number of others who were accused of behavior
in precisely the same manner, and who were prominent

Filipinos, I believe actually took risks to help, at least
in their own minds.
I think they would lie in bed at
night worrying about whether they would live through the
next day or not, and in their own mind they were really
trying to help, I believe them on that.
Some of these
leaders actually were helping to get supplies to the
guerrillas who were fighting the Japanese, were helping to
hide information from the Japanese, were hiding individuals
who were escaping from the Japanese, and were risking
their lives to do so.
Now one of these became President afterwards -- Roxas.
He was an individual who some Filipinos claimed had
collaborated far more than most Filipinos, but whom other
Filipinos I talked to (guerrillas and so forth) said
had helped them.
They needed people to play a role close
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to the Japanese and keep tabs on what the Japanese planned
for controlling population, so that they could take
countermeasures and keep safe and keep operating.

.

But it's very hard to go in after an event and determine
But I

precisely what a guy has in his heart at the time.

do feel that many of these people -- Aguinaldo, Roxas and
the others -- actually were trying to help the Resistance
against the occupation, and doing it in the one way that
was really open to them to do it.
Q:

Did you ever meet Aguinaldo?

A:

Yes.

Q:

What's your personal evaluation of the man, in connection

with the early resistance of the 1900s?
A:

When I met him, he was a patriarchal figur e.

lunch with him and his granddaughter one day.

I

I

had

was very

interested in two cannons he had out on the front porch,
which were remnants of his own campaign against the
Americans of many years before.

So we talked mostly about

this old campaign and the weapons he had to use, the stuff
that they would cram in for grapeshots -- rocks and nails
and such.
I didn't get a chance then of discussing political
philosophy with him at all, but he still wore, as did the
veterans of the campaign, what they called their "rayadillo"

,.

a uniform, a grey striped seersucker type of material,
coat and pants -- the uniform of the revoluntionaries against
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the Americ ans.

And he still dressed in these old clothes .
But later, just before I left the Philipp ines, he
asked to see me again to tell me of his loyalty to the
United States and the reasons for it, and when I went to
see him his grandd aughter told me that he was too ill to
see me, and I never got a chance. She gave me some words
from him orally that he had passed on for her to give me,
a sort of outline of what he wanted to talk about, but he
was in effect saying that there were qualiti es about the
Americ ans and things that we believe d in that he had to
share, and that over many, many years, if the Americ ans
stuck to their beliefs and their princip les, they would
have the friends hip of not only people like him but people
who had his own beliefs and who lived all over the world.
He said that this was the one great thing about Americ ans,
and that most Americ ans didn't underst and that that was the
great thing about them.
They were looking for the materi al
things that they did, but it was the spirit of their
beliefs that was the real thing about_ Americ ans.
It was very touchin g.
I had pubicly express ed though ts
in this same vein about the relatio nship between Filipin os
and Americ ans.

So, I couldn 't tell whethe r my own words
were coming back to me, or whethe r he knew of my beliefs
and he was trying to reassur e me, or what.
Q:

He had a book publish ed just prior to his death, where
he rea.ffir med this .same feeling .
A:

That's right.
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Q:

Speaking of resistance groups I want to touch on one

controversial topic, and that is the Huks.

How useful

were the Huks as a resistance organization?
A:

Well, they were initially useful in a negative way, in

that they tied up a lot of Japanese troops who went in and
almost wiped them out initially.

This was in '42, up

around the Mt Arayat area of Central Luzon.

The early Huks

had grandiose ideas of forming a great army of resistance
and started to do so, with advice and training by veterans
of the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army, veterans then in
the Philippines.
The Chinese instructors who had been helping the Huks
in '42 took a dim view of the Huks' ability to learn the
hard tactics and discipline to be good revolutionaries,
and to continue existing as a guerrilla army against the
Japanese occupiers.

The Chinese withdrew from being

advisers with the Huks prior to the big Japanese attack
on the Huks.

The Chinese then started their own guerrilla

organization, with about 1,500 Chinese in the Philippines,
and called themselves the Wachi guerrillas.
Q:

Was this among overseas Chinese?

A:

Yes, these were overseas Chinese in the Philippines.

The Wachi guerrillas were much more subtle than the Huks.
They were mostly information collectors; they were far more
clandestine as an organization than a group of guerrillas

,,

living in the hills.

They called themselves guerrillas,

but while they had some terrorists to enforce their
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security, mostly they were an intelligen ce-collect ing outfit.
The Huks were clobbered real hard by the Japanese, and
it took them some little time to get organized again .
In
the period when they were gathering up their scattered
remnants and coming up with a sounder organizati on plan,
a number of other Filipino groups of guerrillas had grown
big, some close by the Huks.
They weren't communist s, and
didn't want to have any part of the Huks.
The Huks, of
course, had a very definite idea that they were going to
become top dogs eventually in the Philippine s . They weren't
fighting against the Japanese so much, as fighting for
their own idea of eventual rule.
So, from about 1943 on, the Huks were spending more
time fighting against the other gue r rillas -- the Philippine
guerrillas -- than they were fighting against the Japanese.
(interrupt ion)
Q:

We were talking about the Huks. What was their local
program, communist ideology aside? Were they truly
concerned with the inequities within the Philippine society?
A:

One group of them certainly was.
The Socialist party
members who were from the Agrarian regions of Central Luzon,
and had initially joined the Socialist party for idealistic
re~sons -- and that included people like Luis Ta ruc, who
was their military le a der
initially wanted to rectif y
injustices to the farmers of Central Luzon who were l argely
tenant farmers.

There were a lot of inequities in land
court trials, against tenant farmers.
It was a v ery poo r
life for anybody who didn't have his own land.
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The Socialists merged with .t he Communists prior to World
War II and prior to the Huk movement forming. Among the
leaders of the Huks were the Communists, who largely had
been city intellectuals, and who I think might have felt
for the farmers only as an intellectual exercise, but with
nothing in their heart for them at all. Then the ex-farm
boys who were leaders still had a feeling in their hearts
of wanting to right some rural wrongs.
The latter still
would try to help the people and do some things for them.
Yet many of the people would be repelled by the manner in
which the Huks would go after their work, because there
was almost constant conflict between an intellectual, cold
demand for discipline and going towards the main objective
all the time, plus the local folks, who would want to help
their fellow townsman or their fellow provincial out there
to get some things, and who still had to come under the
iron discipline of the Politburo types.
This sort of
schism in the ranks of the Huks continued throughout the
system, and some of the atrocities that took place were
by farm boys who feared the iron discipline or had finally
become accustomed to so~t of blindly carrying out the
orders of the intellectuals who were saying, "Well, in
effect you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs,
and to hell with the bloodshed and so on," which is
necessary for a revolution, and rather coldly just going
ahead with it.
I recall once Taruc himself was dressed down by the
Politburo, and was made to go through "self criticism" and
so on, at the height of his power, to show how wrong he'd
been to have any ideals that might divert even in the
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the slightest way from the Communist ideal, of having some
human feelings and so forth.
He fought against this, but
he finally had to go through a "self criticism" session
just to satisfy the Politburo, of which he was a member at
the time.
Q:

In 1950, at the personal request of President Quiro . . .

A:

Quirino.

Q:

Excuse me, Quirino -- you were transferred to JUSMAG
in the Philippines, to advise the intelligence service of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. What were your duties
at that time?

Could you elaborate on this?

A:

The reason for the request was that my prior service
in the Philippines had included helping to put together
the Philippine military intelligence service, the G-2 of

the Philippine Army, after World War .II, and helping them
get started, so that my role as an adviser in intelligence
matters had really started again years before, and was
rather well known.
So in 1950, when the request came
through for my services again, I was in Washington and was
doing staff work on cold war problems, with a group that
consisted of officers and officials from various U.S.
services, civilian and military, other services in the
State Department and so on.

It was the first attempt of

the Truman Administration to come up with cold war doctrines
and practices and so on.
The request was brought to me by the then chief of
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JUSMAG, Gen Jonathan Anderson.

He told me that the Huks

had become so dominant in the Philippines that President
Quirino of the Philippines felt that the Huks were secretly
dominating the capital city of Manila as well as the countryside, to the extent that at night he had armored scout
cars parked around his bedroom and so forth before he'd go
to sleep.

The White House of the Philippines is Malacanan
Place, and he had armor around his bedroom inside the
Palace grounds.
happening.

This was how fearful he was of what was
He felt that the Philippine intelligence

service weren't pinpointing the enemy enough so that he
could start coping with their infiltration of Manila and
of the countryside.
At the time, in doing the staff work that I was doing,
I was far more interested in a subject way past intelligence
work itself, (of finding out about the enemy), but was
more concerned about, well, once you find out about him,
what do you do next?
I was doing considerable thinking on the subject, and
producing studies and operational proposals .
Q:

To deviate for just a second, was this the special
forces concept getting started?

A:

No, the special forces was an army contribution to this
whole thing, and I had nothing at all to do with the special
forces, at the time. The staff had been created initially
by Secretary Forrestal, and this was an amorphous sort of
an organization that had been put together to cope with
something that the United States had never coped with before.
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We were all in a way like blind men on the subject.
But I told Gen Anderson, and had the backing of the
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force who was Twining at
the time, and of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs was .

. not Robertson, it was before

Robertson, but I can't think at this moment who it was.
Anyway with their backing I offered to go on out and
do the intelligence work, but also cope with much more
than that.
My advisory service with JUSMAG was negotiated in part
by Gen Anderson who had been my commanding general previously
in the Philippines, and we were close friends, and by the
State Department through the Ambassador out in the
Philippines, Myron Cowen. They were finally agreed that I
would work not only on intelligence matters but helping
with the whole ball of wax of coping with the Huk rebellion.
This was agreed to by President Quirino and by the then
chief of staff of the Philippine Armed Forces, Gen Castaneda.
So I went out to the Philippines with a pretty fuzzy
but wide term of reference, you might say, of what my
duties would be, and with the blessing of the Air Force
and of the State Department, and with both the political
and the military support from Washington to see what could
be done in that situation.
Q:

Was this sort of an offspring of this cold war problem
group? Had you by then formulated certain ideas?
A:

Yes.
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Q:

And you felt that this might be a good place to try
them out and see if they worked?

A:

Well, I had some ideas, and I had written some memos
on political warfare and on psychological warfare, and
I was trying to get the Army to pay more attention to
psychological warfare -- I should say all of the services,

but I single out the Army because the Army was the only one
that still had a vestige of a psychological warfare
organization.
And . . . GARBLE . . . was a member of the Army group
that was trying to plan some things to keep unconventional
operations alive in the Army, and he and the others were
aiding and abetting what I was trying to do, but once I
talked to Gen Anderson and it looked as though I was to be
assigned to the Philippines, I went to anyone in the
services or out who knew anything about psychological warfare during Wo~ld War II, and talked to the ambassador and
the military attache at the Philippine Embassy, and got all
of the Philippine military students in the U.S. who were
attending various courses in all the services all over the
U.S. to come in on their own at the end of their training
period.
If we could get enough of them together i n
Washington at one time we would hold a seminar on psy war.
This was held, as I recall, in June of 1950 in the
Pentagon, and I had a number of folks who had gone on to
civilian life.
I remember there was one of the reporters
for Newsweek who had been in psy war in Europe , and there
were some folks serving with the State Department who had
been in the military in World War II, and t here were lawy e rs
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and journalists and so forth, who very kindly came in and
offered their services, and we ran a three day seminar for
the Philippine military students of the U.S. in June of
1950 at the Pentagon.
I think it was the first psy war
school after World War II.
Actually it was a true seminar, in that the instructors
were curious about the Huk campaign in the Philippines, as
I was, about what had happened since I left the Philippines
in 1948.
We were trying to get up to date on what the problems
were. The students were talking, and they in turn kept
saying, "What should we do on this thing?" And the
instructors were coming up with ideas, and I was gett i ng my
first initiation in psy war, and I was listening real
hard, and I was asking as many questions as anybody else.
So I put down psy war as one of the things I was
trying to carry out along with anything else that would be
needed in the way of conventional war against the Huks.
One of the people that I met during this period in
early 1950 in Washington was a congressman who was chairman
of the Philippine House Military Affairs Committee. His
name was Magsaysay.
He was in Washington lobbying for veteran's benefits.
The Philippine Army had sent a colonel along to assist
him, and the Philippine colonel -- Montemayor
was a very
close friend of mine. We had dinner together when the two
of them got to town, and the colonel told me, "This
congressman I am with is quite a man, and you've got to get
to know him." So he brought me together with Magsaysay and
we started talking about the Huk campaign.
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I was tremendously impressed by Magsaysay.
We spent some time together.
at Fort Myer at the time.

I was living in the BOQ

And Magsaysay, this colonel and

I sat there in my small room talking till midnight for
several nights; we had very long sessions together.
With the impressions I had, I gave a luncheon for as
many folks as I could importune in the Pentagon and in the
State Department, in high level positions, to come and meet
him.

We had a session at the Hotel Washington, in the

dining room there.
I remember that!

I went broke taking them all to lunch,
I meant to expose them to the Philippine

problems as seen by a man who came roughly from the Huk
area in Central Luzon, but over on the coast.

What he had

to say was very important, as he had a tremendous feeling
for the conditions of the people, and why the government
must try and help them.
He also had taken some very dim views about the Philippine
Army and troop misbehavior among civilians.

As chairman

of the House Military Affairs Committee he was trying to
get them to behave better.

He was full of realistic ideas.

He in turn was very much impressed at meeting officials
here in Washington, so it was a good thing.
When I got to the Philippines finally in September of
1950, I was trying to see about getting supplies out for
unconventional operations, including loud hailers, parachutes,
and other things, and was having a hell of a time, because
a

the Korean War was going on at that time, and all of our
supplies were going to Korea.
I was going to the unknown or the unpopular war, and
it took me a long time to scrounge second-hand equipment
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and some condemned equipment that I promised to rehabilita te
and use.
I finally got some old beach master equipment
loud
hailers -- from the Navy for landing, and promised to put
air holes in on their power packs, which otherwise would
explode from gas production -- the reason they had been
condemned.
So all I did was knock holes in the power packs, and
let them breathe a little bit. Despite the tropical rains
of the Philippine s, they worked and were safe.
By the time I got to the Philippine s, Magsaysay had
been asked by President Quirino to become Secretary of
Defense.
So when I arrived in the Philippine s, I found a
man whom I had been talking to in Washington , whose ideas
I agreed with very strongly, who was the civilian leader of
the effort against the Huks.
Q:

Excuse me, did you or official Washington have anything
to do with his (Magsaysay ) becoming Secretary of Defense?

A:

I suspect that there might have been some influence,
but it would have been mostly the influence of Americans
in Manila talking about Magsaysay to President Quirino more
than anything.
I think it would have happened anyhow -I'll put it that way.
I think we might have aided and

abetted it a little bit by knowing the man, and saying,
when asked by President Quirino, "Yes, he is a good man."
That sort of thing, rather than going in and making a deal
there was none of that. But Magsaysay was very much a
person in his own right, and very highly esteemed by Quirino,
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and I am sure this would have happened anyway, even if
there hadn't been an American interest or anything.
Q:

In the Philippines, after independence in the 50s, were
the same old families, going all the way back to people who
had been working with the Spanish since the turn of the
century, still really in charge of what happened in the
Philippines?
A:

They were in some sectors.

The large property owners

who were the people that had really gotten along well with
the Spanish, were the identical people that got along very
well with the Americans, and who were attempting to influence
the politics of the independent Philippines, and elected
their own political leaders.
However, a rather energetic and aggressive middle class
was coming up, taking over the power and attempting to carry
out reforms, and they were very different from the old ruling
class. Magsaysay was part of the middle class which was on
the rise.
There were a number of other energetic members
of the reformists, including some who were from the old
ruling families, but who had gone through the Ateneo College
and had been taught by Jesuits -- mostly American Jesuits
at the time -- who were given a social conscience in their
higher education, and who were very much concerned with the
lot of the farmers, the lot of the labor movement, and who
were really leaders in the rank of reform movements of all
sorts in both political and economic affairs.
Some of these
were , -Just as I've been saying this I've been seeing the
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names and faces of a number of them -- some of these were
the younger sons of some of the old families, and some of
the old ruling families, including for example some of the
sugar barons and sugar planters' families, families that
were as reactionary a group of people as I've ever seen,
politically and economically.
Some of their youngsters were Ateneo graduates who
wanted reform, or who were working in every way they knew
to better the lot of the farmer in their own families'
sugar plantations to the extent of really going against
their families, trying to get land holdings for these
people, and start co-ops and sugar mills and sugar planting
associations and so on, and do some uplifting by the
bootstraps.

Some of them were people who hadn't gone to

Ateneo, who were from some of the old families, but who
were then in ROTC in high school or college, at the beginning
of World War II, when the Japanese came in, and as idealistic
students had gone with some of their ROTC instructors into
the hills to be guerrillas.

They had fought all through

the war with a dream -- their really idealistic political
dream -- of. .

"Well, the United States is going to give

us an independent country, and with independence we are
going to have a sort of Eden here, it's going to be a
Shangri-la type of perfect state, and this therefore is
worth a man risking his life for."
When independence came, and then the Huks started
their revolt, they couldn't go along with the Huks because
they'd fought against the Huks among others during the war.
They were seeking some way of carrying out reforms.

Groups

had joined together and when Magsaysay was appointed secretary,
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they said, "Ah, there's our man!

He is one of us."

He

was a guerrilla leader during the war. They joined in to
help him. These were people who eventually did things
like cleaning up the corrupt practices in Customs, who
carried out land reform measures, and were very aggressive
in getting compliance to correct practices in the Philippine
government itself, in the bureaus and so on, who made the
Philippine civil service employee become a t r u e pub lic
servant. These were lads from public schools all through
the Philippine s who had been guerrillas and had their
dreams wrecked afterwards by their own government its e lf
and by the Huks.
Q:

Sir, we've been talking about Magsaysay and the
Philippines. Could you tell me what made the dif f erenc e

with Magsaysay?

Why was he able to be so suc c essful so

rapidly?
A:

That's a simple question with a very complex answer.
There are several main parts to the answer about Mags a ysay.

Let's see if I can split them up and identify them. First,
the force being used by the government against the insurrection,
the Huk guerrillas, was the Armed Forces, which we r e b eing
led by officers who had come up through their careers,
getting promotions etc., through the normal ways of putting
in so much time and so r t of getting good marks on their
efficiency reports and being due for promotion and wi nding
up as the top leaders without meriting it by solving problems
such as the Huk rebellion that they were a g ainst.
I n e ffect ,
you had people occupying a leadership role i n t he Armed
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Forces who really weren't very inspiring nor good military
leaders. A civilian Secretary was put into the spot who
had a very dynamic personality, who was from the troubled
area where the guerrillas were operating, had grown up there
as a boy, and worked there as a man later, and had represented
his district in Congress, so that he knew the political
feelings of his own constituency and the neighboring
constituencies. Here was a man who felt the problem in his
heart as well as in his head, who really started supplying
the leadership that was needed by the Armed Forces to take
care of the problem.
Q:

Did you have to have the right name to rise to high
position in the Armed Forces?

A:

It was a small Armed Forces, a very small professional
group of Philippine Military Academy graduates so there was
a very natural family name type of a thing, or rise in
promotions -- which isn't necessarily a bad thing, mind you -it was, in effect, helping each other to get ahead.
It

wasn't a knowing clique or anything that was out just to be
self-serving.
I suspect a lot of the promotion was done
with good faith and good will.
"I know this man and he was
very sound when he was a student" and so on and helping
him out. A person always thinks better of friends than of
strangers and there was some of that.
But the end result
was the . Armed Forces of the Philippines was fighting against
the Huks and not doing it very well, getting clobbered and
not getting ahead very well. And certainly not being very
innovative in what they were doing.

Also, certainly not
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being a national army that was close to the people. They
were further apart than wearing different clothes, such as
their uniforms, from the people. They felt themselves to
be an army, and an army behaves differentl y than civilians
do and they were very definitely apart from the people.
Here, their new leader, a civilian, who came into office,
and incidently followed another civilian, of course, who
hadn't shown leadership , or the same degree of leadership .
This civilian came in from the people where the troops were
operating against the guerrilla enemy and made surprise
visits to the field, to troop units in operating areas and
bawl them out, in effect, in his inspection s for doing things
wrong that would have the people locally either angry at
them for being bad soldiers or laughing at them. He
started taking corrective actions on his inspection s and
showing up so often in these surprise visits that not only
the officers commanding units, but also the troops in them,
started behaving as though this man would suddenly show up
and be watching them very critically t _o see what they were
doing.
If they did wrong, he was going to call them on the
carpet for it, start taking some corrective actions against
individual s personally . Their behavior, even in his absence,
was "Well, maybe this guy is secretly hiding out someplace
and watching this." They would start doing an exemplary
beh~vior pattern just because of that. At the same time,
when there were things wrong within the military family in
the way of supplies, equipment being wrong or some very
just grievance of troops or officers, something beyond the
normal griping of the field command against headquart ers,
Magsaysay would also listen as well as scold; listen to these
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complaints and then do something about it, bring about some
reforms and some changes.

In this way, suddenly the people

who were in the combat areas and carrying on the fight
suddenly had a champion of their own, as well as a guy that
might bawl them out for doing the wrong thing.

They also

had a man who would get angry at the right things and move
to help them so that they felt suddenly they had a leader
who cared what happened to them.

This started almost

immediately from his first visit out in the field, which
was then talked about among the troops in combat areas.
Almost from the first, the morale started lifting.

Finally

they had a guy from headquarters who really cared about
what happened to them and who would correct things that were
wrong, whether they were at fault or whether the headquarters
group was at fault.
Q:

How much effect did the American advisors have on
pointing out solutions and problems to Magsaysay?

A:

Let me finish this other first.

the change that took place:

That was one part of

military leadership.

was the civilian that was the military leader.

Then it

Seeing what

was happening, I talked to President Quirino personally.

He had invited me in to cabinet meetings to explain some of
the .Huk problem.
I got the President to empower the
Secretary of National Defense, Magsaysay, to promote, give
spot promotions to people and also to dismiss officers from
command when they were doing wrong.

In other words,

strengthen Magsaysay's leadership powers, and did this
against the objections of the then chief of staff of the
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Philippine military, and got the support of the top
governmental leadership behind Magsaysay, to permit him to
be and act as a real leader of the military effort.
Now let me say this.

Another factor in the change

that brought success was that Magsaysay also was out in the
field not only talking to troops but to people in the area
where combat was going on, and he was asking questions not
only about how are the troops behaving around here, but what
is the Government doing here?

Do you see the Mayor of a

city, do you see the Governor of a Province Government?

Do

you see anybody from the Department of Agriculture out here
helping with irrigation or new seed?

And so on.

He would go from these field visits back to Manila and
sit in at a Cabinet meeting. As the Cabinet would start
talking about economy or allocations to the Department of
Agriculture and so forth, here was a man sitting there who
would suddenly get mad and pound the table and say, "Mr
President (or Mr Secretary of Agriculture or whoever), I
have now just come in, and this is what's really going on,
and goddamn it you aren't spending the money for the right
things, and these things aren't happening, and if you don't
do it right, the other side is going to win, and we are
going to lose everything.

You are going to lose your jobs

in the Cabinet, and then the Government, and so on."
So the people suddenly started seeing this man as
their champion, as well as the troops seeing that, so that
as they griped to him there'd be some changes, there would
be a guy from the Department of Agriculture suddenly showing
up, who hadn't been there for years.

His influence or

leadership expanded tremendously, way past the Armed Forces,
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so that they suddenly had a man from the capital city who
would appear to be genuinely interested in what was happening,
and who could be expected to take some action on the things
that were wrong, take some action to correct them.

And the

effect was widespread through the area.
I remember I talked to a guy who was a postmaste r of a
little tiny post office up in the Huk country, and in a
joking way he told me that Magsaysay had made him an honest
man.

He said, "Every time I sit here and look at my money

in my stamp drawer -- it isn't much money, but there's some
there -- I start thinking, Well, I don't have much money and
my family needs some food, and maybe I ought to swipe some
of this.

Then I start thinking that that damn Magsaysay

might suddenly show up and be looking over my shoulder just
as my hand is going into the petty cash drawer, and he'd
throw me in jail.''

And yet he had never seen Magsaysay.

But, the stories being told about Magsaysay started getting
around.
Now all of this of course caused everything that
Magsaysay said and did to be magnified and become much
more effective, so that the situation just seemed to be
waiting for leadership, and he supplied it.
Q:

Sir, as I asked before, in this work that Magsaysay was

doing, was he getting advice and guidance from Americans on
what to do, and what problems needed to be addressed?
A:

Er, this is again a question that's difficult to

answer.

Magsaysay lived with me in my quarters in his

first months in office as Secretary of Defense, simply
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because his family home was insecure, and the Huks had sent
trigger squads in to liquidate this new leader that was
emerging, and I moved him in with me mostly for his personal
The difficulty was that we had crowded quarters,
He had a bed and I had a
so that we had to share a room.
safety.

bed, and we became roommates.
Most of the advice to him at that period was some very
formal advice from the Chief of JUSMAG, Gen Leland Hobbs.
The other U.S. military advisers there would advise mostly
on the U.S. material supplies for the AFP, and not on tactics
or strategy.
My advice to him was mostly initially as a good listener
and friend who let him talk out his problems and would
single out the salient features and talk back the problem
to him as he had thought of it, and what I knew of the scene
as well, and putting values on it in terms of principles
involved and solutions, and letting him pick the right
course, which he would do.

But it was roughly the way two

friends would talk with each other.
Most of his early field visits were done unfortunately
early in the morning, and I like to sleep and sack in. He
would go'on these visits early in the morning, and he would
grab me and have me go along with him, so that I was
present at most of his early field visits, and very often
during them I could tip him off to what a good inspector
would spot and see in a unit, and he would very quickly
pick up the behavior patterns, although many of the things
that he did and his own behavior were quite natural with
him, and he would have done the same whether anybody had
been around or not.
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He wore sport clothes -- a sports shirt and a pair of
slacks on these field visits and he didn't look like the
Secretary of National Defense:

he looked like some guy

out of the province himself.
Q:

Did he wear the Barong Tagalong shirt?

A:

No, he didn't.

He actually in the early days wore an
aloha shirt, and usually a pretty wild one, so that he was

definitely a civilian and had absolutely no appearance of
being a Cabinet officer or a top guy in the Government.
Frequently we would fly in by L-5 aircraft close to the
scene, and Magsaysay would go on the road and thumb rides
for the two of us, and I was in uniform, so that as people
would hesitate I would step up and say, "This man is the
Secretary of Defense," and I would sort of act as his
guarantor that he was for real. And I had to do that with
troops as well, who were incredulous when we first showed
up, but the fact that I was an officer of the United States
Air Force in uniform would vouch for this guy, and it really
would cause them to take a second look at him and listen
to him.
This was in the very early days.
He quickly became
known, of course.
But I remember that on our very first visits I had to
explain to the men and the officers and so on in these units
who the guy was. At the time, because of the fighting that
was going on in Central Luzon, (down to the suburbs of
Manila, the capital city), most of the Americans
including
the U.S. military types
were not permitted to wander
around the countryside, and Gen Hobbs made an exception for
me, and let me wander around.
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It wasn't until well over a year later that Hobbs
finally assigned an officer of JUSMAG to go out in the
field.
I had a small staff of my own, and I got an exception
made for us to wander around where we felt like.
I have
always felt that you have to see something firsthand to
really know what's happening, so I wanted us to be free to
move, and we were given that freedom.
Most of the U.S. advisers there in JUSMAG were going
between the JUSMAG compound, where they lived and had their
offices, a couple of miles up the road to the Philippine
Armed Forces Headquarters, where they'd sit in with the G-1,
2, 3, 4, and so on, and with the chief of the Air Force, or
whatever, and do office work with them.
It was mostly on
supply and handling hardware, systems for keeping hardware
going and so on.
The new advice really that Magsaysay got -- and that I
got myself -- came about, and the only way I can think of
to describe it, is by coffee klatsch sessions.
I had
noticed and learned from getting the Philippine officers
together for the psy war seminar in the Pentagon before I
went out, that there were a number of Philippine officers,
as well as Philippine civilians, who were concerned about
what was happening, who had ideas on what to do about it;
some of them were wild schemes, some of them were very
practical, some of them were very big schemes, some of
them were very little things .
So; with Magsaysay living in the house, of course, we
had a stream of officers from Headquarters coming in to see
him, and he used to start off the day holding office at the
breakfast table at my place, and there wou ld be his aides
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there, and then there would be some of the staff from
Headquarters, who would have to sit and take turns for seeing
him.

Since it was my house I'd give them coffee and I would
sit and talk with them while others were doing business with

the Secretary of Defense.

I'd be talking with the visitors

there, and I also had many visitors of my own, including
some of the field commanders of the Philippine Armed Forces,
who would come in not to see Magsaysay, but who would come
in for 24 hours' leave and wanted a little R

&

R for them-

selves.

We had been friends from years before and they were
used to coming by and telling me what was happening in their
areas of operation, looking for a little bit of hand holding
or a pat on the head or understanding for what they were
going through in combat.
So we would get a mix of Headquarters types and field
types together, of all ranks.

The folks coming in from the

field ran from unit commanders and the big commanders down
to sergeants or less, whom I had known before.
So we had
this tremendous mix of people sitting around drinking
coffee in my place, and we were talking shop, because the
one thing we were doing was fighting a war against the Huks.
A G-3 type would tell about some study they were doing in
his staff, maybe trying to figure out what you do with
prisoners or something. The field guys would start telling
their experiences, and then what the people really wanted.
We would actually wind up with a lot of ideas being generated
there, which led to such things as the EDCOR,

(the rehabilit-

ation of Huk prisoners), of giving them a chance to own their
own farms, having a place for housing their visiting families
when the prisoners were in the stockade, helping the families
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get in to see them, appealing to active Huks to come in and
surrender.

Many of the good ideas of the Huk rebellion came

out of these little coffee klatsch meetings in the house.
What would happen was, as we got to talking, sometimes
we'd forget that the Secretary of Defense was sitting there
trying to do business a few yards away, sitting at the
breakfast table, and we were just around a little corner,
talking.

Our voices would rise up a bit, and the next

thing we knew, Magsaysay would come out and have a cup of
coffee with us.

So here we were getting ideas presented

right at his level as well, you see.
he'd say, "Well, let's try that."

And every so often

Then he would go on down

to Malacanan Palace and talk to the President and the
Cabinet and get Government backing for a project.
A G-3 type would be sitting there, or a G-1 or somebody
from Headquarters, and he would say, "I'll do the staff
work," and he'd run back to do it.

Field commanders would

be there saying, "Give us a chance at that, too, and we'll
make the thing work out there."

So we would have ideas

started and created and sort of staffed out and taught in a
very informal work session, but then almost immediately
solved as far as the staffing of the thing was concerned,
and all of the paperwork and the backing and so on, and we
would get something generated very quickly.

This is an

unusual way of working things out that I have used in many
places in the world, including Vietnam, and I can assure
you that it works.

It's the most simple and the most

natural way of working in the world, far more than the formal
meetings that Americans hold with foreigners all the time.
In these meetings, there was nothing formal.

These
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were a group of people who knew each other and who were
relaxing over a cup of coffee and were sitting close enough
to each other so that they didn't have to get up and make
speeches or anything.

A guy could lean back in a chair and
have his feet propped up on a table or something, and sound
off on something in a very relaxed way.
The guy sitting
next to him could do the same, and ideas would really spring
forth, and also the very practical ways of implementing
these ideas would come up.
Q:

That sounds very good.

(end of side l of tape)
Q:

Sir, after the success of Magsaysay, the Huk rebellion
was virtually crushed, but today there seems to be a
resurgence as the Huks become again more active.
Problems
in the Philippines seem to be getting worse instead of
better.

Is there any simple reason that you can give for

this?
A:

The Huks themselves -- the ones that Magsaysay defeated
were defeated as much for political reasons as for military
reasons.

Their slogans, their recruiting, and their
organizing reasons as stated were all met politically by
social actions or political actions of the Government and of
the armed forces against them, so that they had no reason to
fight again. Now the rules that the Government and the
military followed were the rules that are stated in the
Philippine Constitution and in the Philippine Electoral
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Code.

They are part of the rules that the Filipinos themselves have set to govern themselves , and they are good

rules.

So, in effect, the Huks were defeated as soon as
the people on the Governmen t side actually followed their
own rules, and once they did that, the Huks had no reason
to overthrow the Governmen t, because it became a governmen t
of and by and for the people.
So, if the Philippine Governmen t had been true to its
own rules right along, and if it had been a governmen t of,
by, and for the people, no people would try and overthrow
it, because it was their own, and there are orderly ways of
changing things with it.
So the only way that a group of rebels could start
again would be if the people felt that the rules weren't
being followed anymore, that there were privileged exceptions
to the rules, and that there were just grievances that
the people had, to be solved in no other way except by armed
force, so that in effect the following that the Huks would
have today, by and large, would be from people dissatisfi ed
with the way the rules are worked out by the Governmen t.
Now, this of course clearly indicates where a blame
might lie, and also where a solution might lie.
In other
words, if the Governmen t itself really was true to its
principles of governing, as laid down in the Constituti on
and in the Electoral Code, then there wouldn't be any
grievances really that couldn't be met by peaceful means and
by people trying to solve the problems that the country
faces, and there wouldn't be Huks fighting against the
constituti onal governmen t.
The Huks would be primarily
what they were when they started up again in their first
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Starting
resurgence -- frankly bandits and racketeers .
again, they were made up mostly of criminals, not of political
Pretty common stickup artist type guys who
fighters.
became protection racketeers , mostly close to the big U.S.
bases there, where they had nightclubs and beer parlors,
and gals hanging out in houses where they would let the
criminal element grow up with protection rackets or girl
rackets, gambling and all the usual things.
The Huks went from that criminal boss activity -- and
they weren't politicall y motivated initially in their resurgence ,
but gradually, as people were looking for another polarizati on
to find some solutions to their grievances , and of course
getting into the political field, as the Governmen t wasn't
satisfying their political needs, a lot of the crooks and
Initially they
so forth then started becoming political.
did it like a political Boss Tweed or something, in Tammany,
of turning out the electorate again for money mostly, and for
influence of congressme n and so forth, who would get elected
from there, but with a very bright remnant left of some of
the Communist Party folks, the theoretica l end of the thing,
saying, "Here is real opportunit y knocking, and I don't care
if a man is a crook and so forth, he's got some power in a
place where there is dissatisfa ction." And they started
moving in on the thing and giving it a political polarizati on
again, as the old Huks had. But the initial basis of this
was very different than that of the original Huks, in that
now they were really racketeers .
the 13th Air Force at
I know that the U.S. Air Force
Clark Air Force Base -- I am sure that their security files
are filled with things like simple theft, armed robbery and
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the racketeering and protection rackets, the gambling, girls
and so on, in nearby towns, close to the base, that gave the
start to guys who now command this that and the other thing
of a Huk armed force.

The genesis of this thing is quite

different than the Agrarian reform movement of the initial
Huks, when the Agrarian Socialist Party of Central Luzon
merged with the Communist Party of Manila City, the waterfront laborers and other ''proletariat", to initially field
an army of original Huks during the Japanese time.

So

that today's types are now a militant expression of
dissatisfaction with the Government.

And I think the

solution again basically is one of government reform and so
on, and giving some justice to all, as a way of solving the
problem again.
The recycling theory might be correct, since the area
where this is happening today is the same area where the
agrarian malpractices caused some trouble earlier, and where
a sort of a scrappy population had taken on the first
American pacification forces during the so-called "Philippine
Rebellion" at the very beginning of this century, but had
also fought Spanish armies during the old Spanish colonial
days.

There had been big fights around and in places

which have since been the same places where the later Huks
stood and fought against the Philippine Armed Forces, and
where today's racketeering Huks are operating.

All the

same area.
So there might be something sociological ly -- an

,,

association between the man on the land and the poor soil
or something, not letting him get a good living, a man's
feeling of frustration from birth almost that he was not
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given a fair break in life, might well cause this.

But

again, if there is a government that says, "We are your
government," and actually behaves that way to the point
where he feels that his government is very responsive to his
problems and his needs, and that he can work with it, then
they can start meeting on some of the problems that exist.
It's obvious that they aren't doing this, and therefore
he is taking the other way to get redress for his grievances.
Q:

Are you being consulted at all by the Philippine Government?

A:

No.

Q:

That's too bad.

Sir, in 1953 you joined Gen O'Daniel's

mission to the French forces in Indochina.

What was your

capacity, and what effect did you have on American-French
relationships after you'd been there for a while?
A:

I was picked out on sort of the spur of the moment.

I

was in the Philippines when the O'Daniel mission was en
route to Saigon, and at the last minute, so to speak,
O'Daniel asked me to join the mission and come along with him.
When I arrived in Saigon with him the French were
quite surprised that I was there, and a number of the staff
officers close to Gen Navarre, who had just assumed the
French command, had known of what I had been doing in the
Philippines, and were very worried about me as a revolutionary
type who might stir up the natives against the French.

So,

as far as my relations with the French, I might say it was
one of watchful waiting on their part, always fearing the
worst.
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However, Gen Navarre seemed to welcome my arrival.

He

was putting together his plan, as well as O'Daniel doing a
report on what the French needed.

So between Navarre and

O'Daniel I was assigned the task of coming up with thoughts
for Navarre on the unconventional annexes to his plan.
"Unconventional'', in this wise, were the annexes on
what they called Maquis or guerrilla forces that were operated
by the French,

(in 1953 they were largely Maquis, among the

Montagnards of the mountain tribal people of the Indochina
states), and psychological warfare by the French and
Vietnamese forces primarily, and of intelligence collection,
particularly combat intelligence.
Then, by chance, I got in with the French airborne
paratroopers, and worked out some thoughts with them up in
the regions of the North Headquarters, at Hanoi, with the
French airborne and Gen Cogny's staff on these airborne
operations, based from the Red River delta perimeter.
So the ann~es contained sort of a mixed bag of clandestine
Ops and secret missions and intelligence collection type of
things.

Working on these plan annexes permitted me to get

in and talk shop with the French officers who were involved
with all of this.

It was on their own operations and ideas

on how to better them, and often on how a field command
could get more help from Headquarters to let them do a good
job.

The French Army was no different than any other army

in that respect .

Frequently the Headquarters staffs would

look on what these particular unconventional types were
doing as something sort of esoteric and not really military
and not actually needed, and would give them short change in
the way of airlift or weapons or whatever else they needed.
So most of the people that I was working with would
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immediately telli me how misunderstood they were by their
own higher command, and would have a long list of needs .
But the problem about these needs always would be, "Can
you get them to understand what I am trying to do and support
me?"

So that usually the No. 1 problem was the understanding

that was lacking -- the understanding of the needs that they
had.
Q:

There was need for more understanding.
I've heard that one of the problems with the French was

that they were sort of road-bound, and really didn't like
to operate in small unit actions in the jungle.

Is this

true or false?
A:

Well, it's largely true, not entirely so.

They

certainly had a number of French officers who were serving
for very long periods of service in Indochina, much longer
than any U.S. military have ever served there.

There would

be officers I'd run into that had served 8 or 9 years there
consecutively , 10,000 miles away from ~ome and away from
their families in France, with no home leave and no break
from their service, who were dedicated to the struggle that
they were in, and would become very close to groups of
people on the ground there, who had a very genuine affection,
I think, for the people, and ~ho had finally worked into
types of service that would permit them to serve in among
them.

Many of the French Maquis leaders and advisers who

were in with the tribal people had been adopted by the
tribes, and they shacked up with native gals, and were
partically part

of the tribes that they were serving in.

And they certainly were far from being road-bound types.
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The same was true of a lot of the Frenc h airbo
rne
types out there , who were sort of the cream of
the Frenc h
profe ssion al fight ing men, whos e one majo r comp
laint to me
was that none of the gene rals seeme d to know how
to use them
corre ctly. And again there was a plea for unde
rstan ding of
the airbo rne role, where they wante d to get away
from the
sort of old fashi oned conv entio nalit y of their
leade rs and
reall y do some envel opem ent of the enemy from
the air and
surp rise him, and get into place s that they coul
dn't get to.
But their main comp laint was that they were usua
lly used
as an airbo rne unit desig nated as a supp ort unit
and dropp ed
in to a supp ort posit ion to infan try that moved
into an
area by truck .
They said that it would have been just as
easy to move us in by truck as the infan try that
we were
going in to supp ort. They were righ t, of cour
se.
What they wante d to do was to get away from the
norm al
type of thing , get out beyon d the norm al infan
try tacti cs,
and drop in behin d the enemy some place , and oper
ate in a
much freer fashi on than they had.
So takin g just this one
exam ple of their airbo rne oper ation s, which they
later
after I was there -- start ed using in a less conv
entio nal
way, I would say from what they told me and from
what I
saw that by and large the Frenc h were road- boun
d. Not only
that, but they were think ing in terms of posi tiona
l war
when they put up forts , to guard first of all
bridg es, and
then to guard villa ges, as well as forti fied zones
for
guard in~ rice produ cing areas .
All of this was posi tiona l warf are in their think
ing,
again st an enemy who wasn 't think ing posi tiona
l warf are at
all and who would cross their lines at nigh t and
do othe r
very unfa ir thing s to the conv entio nal types .
This enemy
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moved around them and continued a war of movement against
the French who were thinking positional war.

French use of

roads and equipment actually, although it looked like a
war of movement, kept them into narrow corridors and zones,
and was in essence a positional warfare concept, with an
enemy going on foot and not paying attention to it.
Then, when the French got real daring and would try
the unconventional, they would essentially do commando type
They would go in and shoot everything in sight,
raids.
burn down what was there, and destroy means of support to
Since the enemy was basing his support among the
an enemy.
people, this meant burning down the homes of people, blowing
up bridges that people would use, and leaving a scorched
earth behind that would make all of the people on the scorched
So, in effect,
earth hate those who had brought it about.
these commando type of raids which were looked on as very
unconventional operations, actually were causing great harm
in a very conventional sense to the cause of the French, and
were letting the political cadres among the Communist troops
go in and recruit the villagers and farmers to pay back the
The people
enemy for doing these horrible things to them.
would say, "Yes, I'd like to pay the French back."
Q:

Was Dien Bien Phu supposed to be an air head for

activities in the rear?

In other words, although it had a

position in terms of protecting Laos, was it also supposed
to act as a focal point for guerrilla and true unconventional
activities in the rear of the Viet Minh?
A:

Dien Bien Phu was intended to prove the theory that, if
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you could ever get guerrilla forces lured onto a killing
ground where you'd have enough fire power t o liquidate the
guerrillas, you'd win the war against guerrillas.
In
effect this was supposed to be a very large trap, to lure
the Viet Minh guerrillas onto a killing ground, where you
could have not only the guns, but you'd have airstrips and
a way of mounting air power quickly against them tactically,
and you'd get an enemy lured into a place where you could
kill him. The fact that the enemy also looked at the F r ench
putting up positions there and were saying, to themse,Lveis:, ,
"Gee, these guys are getting on to our killing ground,"
didn't mean that the guerrillas
. . well, the guerrillas
made better use of this theory than the French did, who
had conceived it and tried to implement it.
Now the first thing that the guerrillas did was to take
the high ground overlooking the forts at Dien Bi en Phu.
Unfortunately for the French, the killing ground wasn' t
the troop killing ground that the French had picked , since
the high observation points weren't manned by the French
in the mountains around there. When the enemy o c cup i ed the
high mountains surrounding Dien Bien Phu, he immediately got
observation of the French, so that as the enemy brought up
artillery , i t was really the first time that the e nemy
could ever observe his artillery fire, correct it, and make
it very effective.
So the first thing that caught the
French by surprise was Viet Minh artillery , for th e first
time coming in and being very accurate and knocking out the
French guns and the French forts and the French troops.
Instead of correcting that, which got more a n d more
difficult as time went on, the French never got the e n emy
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off of the high point where he could observe what he was
doing, and using long range weapons.

They tried air power

against it, but the bombing was very poor.

It certainly

didn't drive the enemy off the high ground.

If anybody

ever said it was effective, it wasn't effective enough to
change that part of the situation.
The enemy cut the roads and started a seige.

With

artillery support, accurately observed fire, he then mounted
ground attacks that started succeeding, while the French
kept beefing up their bad positions down actually in the
bottom of the bowl in the hills -- they kept putting more
targets in for the enemy to hit.
men on the French side.

There were very brave

I know that they used to go around

at the headquarters of the French Army, like in Saigon,
announcing that they were getting an airlift into Dien Bien
Phu,

at that time that the airlift used the airstrips at

Dien Bien Phu, but these later were knocked out, and
reinforcements would have to jump in by 'chute, so that it
was a one way trip for the guys who would go there.
Mind you, many volunteer reinforcements were headquarter
types, hardly the bravest men in the world ordinarily.

But

the call would say that they could take, say, 50 guys in.
They'd say, "We want volunteers," and everybody assembled
there would take one pace forward and volunteer, everybody.
Then they would select the 50 that they could take that
morning.

But it was a one way trip for these guys, and

they knew it.

They knew that they'd jump in and t h ere was

no way for them of getting out again.
there were volunteers.

And yet every day

These were very courageous guys.

You can call them foolish or anything else, but you certainly
have to admit that they were courageous.
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Q:

Giap has intimated on occasion that Dien Bien Phu was
a lot closer thing than most people realize.
Is that something he just does for the dramatic effect, or was it close?

Well, certainly a lot of the enemy were killed in that,
but as far as a close thing is concerned I talked to some of

A:

the French who were taken prisoners at Dien Bien Phu and were
later released. When they were en route through Saigon on
the way home to Metropolitan France, they told me not only
about the battle but about what happened afterwards. As
prisoners, some of them were taken by the Viet Min h down to
Dien Bien Phu to recreate the battle for the official
movies of the Communists on what happened there.
They were
to reenact the defeated French, you see, and as they got
back to Dien Bien Phu in their old fortified positions,
they were amazed to find them under water.
What had happened was that Giap occupying the Heights
at the beginning of the watershed had diverted streams,
any water flows and gullies, with crews of laborers digging
new streambeds, to direct all the water down the wate r shed
and onto the French fortification s.
When the rains came,
it was just like turning on a faucet in a bathtub.
The
French forts were down at ~he bottom of the bathtub, and
all this water just came down and flooded the area.
So, if it was a close thing it must have been political
pressure on Giap to win a victory by the time Geneva met.
The Geneva negotiations were then taking place, with the
political representativ es of the Viet Minh present at
Geneva, the pressure was for a victory, useful i n Genev a
bargaining, rather than any physical thing on the battlefield,
I think.

So it's a political timing "close" thing .
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I personally think that if I had been a political boss
of Giap I would have started asking him, "Why did you have
so many guys making suicidal attacks and get creamed in
attacking the forts, when you could have held on just a
little bit and ground off the French there?"
Q:

I guess from what you said that it must have been a
political thing.

A:

It must have been, and that again says an awful lot

about an enemy, and the same enemy that we are fighting too.
Where politics fits in his thinking -- it's all part of the
same war.
Q:

Sir, you mentioned earlier that the French soon began

to dislike you very much, particularly right at the 19541955 time period.
A:

Could you explain why this was?

I am not certain that I have firm answers on this.

I

felt at the time -- and I still suspect it might be true
that they were looking for some reason why they were defeated
in Indochina.

Being human they did a very human thing.

Instead of looking in a mirror to take a look at the guys
who were there and were defeated, they started looking
elsewhere, and thinking that certainly some outside influence
somewhere must have had a hand in this, and at that time I
had become close to Diem who was the new Prime Minister that
was sent in by Bao Dai, and so they figured that somehow or
other I was turning the Vietnamese against them -- against
the French, that is -- and therefore must have somehow or
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other had the Vietnamese defeat them during the Franco-Viet
Minh War, even though I wasn't there except for a brief
visit in '53.

They wanted a scapegoat.

In their emotionalism on this, they even started
claiming that I was trying to start World War III.

I have

never been able to come up with any rational explanation of
why all this was.

I do know that it was present, and that

some of the French magazines and newspapers reflected that.
At the time, they saw me as a very villainous figure who
was working against the French, which simply wasn't true.
One odd thing was that the French had agreed already to
the independence of Vietnam, and yet I was in part blamed
for wanting the Vietnamese to be independent of the French.
It was something that had been agreed to by the French
themselves long before I showed up on the scene.
I was blamed for a number of other things that fran kly
were already statements on paper, proposed by French
politicians and leaders in France, and had been agreed to
internationally.

And yet it struck the people on the ground

that somehow or other this was all new.

It's irrational as

far as I am concerned.
A Swiss journalist who was there at the time tried to
explain it to me one time.

I am not sure his explanation

was valid, but he said that the French are very emotional
people, and when it comes to the Vietnamese it's a little
bit as though it were a man who had a mistress, who had
gotten tired of the mistress and was leaving and said the
mistress was free.

All of a sudden, one day, he sees his

ex-mistress going by in a new Cadillac, and here is this damn
other guy -- meaning you, or an American -- who's got the
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mistres s there in this Cadilla c going by, and even though the
man had already given up his mistres s and so forth, he says,
"The only way that guy could get a girl like that would be
with a new Cadilla c." So among other things, the French
claim that I was buying the friends hip and loyalty of the
Vietnam ese, and every time that they would ever mention
an activit y of mine, it would usually be that I was out with
a suitcas e full of piastra s -- million s of dollars worth of
money -- buying somebod y. This wasn't true at all, but
they could only see that the wealthy America n was out buying
off the people to disli k e the French.
Now the fact that a lot of the people out in the
country side didn't like the French -- that even if they
hadn't been Commu nists , they were fightin g as nationa ls
agains t the Fren ch for their indepen dence, long befor e I
ever showed up on the scene, and having this burning desire
to be free and indepen dent were thus anti-Fr ench -- that
didn't seem to e n ter into French thinkin g at all. All
they could see was that when I became friends with these
same people, being an America n and not wanting them as a
colony or anythin g, and simply moving around among the people
and trying to help them as far as I could out of friends hip,
seeing me c l ose to the people they tried to ascribe some
kind of reason for this, so they figured I must be paying
them, which of course I never did.
I frequen tly was accused
of that.

•

.,

One of the accusa tions came about in a formal , officia l
briefin g one day.
I forget who it was
I think i t was
the U.S. Army Chief of Staff from the Pentago n who wa s
visitin g Vietnam . There was a militar y brief ing for him
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at MAAG Headquarters, I had been busy on staff work,
showed up at .the briefing a bit late and sat down in
row, just to hear what was going on. As I sat down,
heard a French officer (who was part of the briefing

so I
the rear
I
team)

briefing these visitors from Washington, describe about
Col Lansdale -- myself -- being down in the country trying
to buy the loyalty of a Hoa Hao rebel by the name of BA Cut
at that very moment. He went on about how stupid I was not
to know that BA Cut had lured me down there just to get the
suitcase full of money that I had. He added that Americans
such as myself were the thing that was ruining everything
in the relationships between the French and people like
BA Cut and other Vietnamese.
spoiled the story.

When he paused for breath I
I got up and asked, "Go on, tell me,

was I killed or not this afternoon down there?" Here he
was, thinking I was at 100 miles distance, and believing
it, and telling this story.

He got so mad at me he shut

up and left the room.
all.

Later, he wouldn't speak to me at
Apparently the French believed these stories. Now

here was a highranking French professional soldier, giving
an official briefing to a high ranking professional soldier
from Washington on the situation, telling just sheer fantasy,
and undoubted ly believing it as he told this fairy tale.
The fact that I not only wasn't carrying money, but wasn't
present in the area where he said this was happening, and
was physically visible present many miles away and in the
presence of these people, never stopped the French from
keeping on telling that same damn story!
I was blamed and
V

accused of this on and on and on, all the time I was there.
Now what would cause people to do that? And how to
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get them to stop?

I don't know.
It baffled me.
Even
when it was demonstr ably untrue, the stories continue d.
I don't think it would ever get beyond this.
I think the French were just hurting very very much
from their defeat, and they were just hoping that they
weren't to blame themselv es, or were hoping somehow or
other that some dirty foreigne r some place had really caused
that harm to France. And there I was, quite visible.
So
I became the butt of it.
Q:

Did you subseque ntly play a role toward Diem that was
similar to your role with Magsaysa y?

A:

Well I was seeing Diem almost every day.

(interrup tion)

Q:

Sir, you were saying that you were seeing Diem every
day. What sort of relation ship evolved?

A:

Initiall y, I saw him the day after he first returned to
his country as Prime Minister in '54, I watched the way he
came in, seeing the mistakes that he made in the way he
came into the City of Saigon from the airport. He disappoi nted
the many, many, many thousand s of people who'd lined the

streets to welcome him.
Somebody had advised him, apparen tly,
to be wary of the people. He came by in a closed car
maybe 60 MPH, with a motorcyc le escort. Nobody got a chance
to see him. The people were emotion ally upset by Communi st
victorie s and thought that here was a man who was going to
save them.
They wanted to cheer him, see him, demonst rate,
and he didn't give them a chance to do so.
I figured
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he must be getting some very bad advice from his family and
from Vietnamese friends.

Thus, I wrote a memo that night,

suggesting some actions that Diem might consider following.
I checked them out the next morning with the ambassador and
J

the chief of MAAG who told me to go ahead and show it to
Diem.

I looked up Diem at the palace and introduced myself,

giving him these suggested ideas.

Mostly, they were what

I had learned from the Vietnamese people.

They covered a

wide range of subject matter, of things that the Vietnamese
people were aspiring for and hoped would get a response on
the part of one of their leaders.
He kept my memo, and he invited me to stop by and see
him again.

I did so.

A relationship finally evolved

where I would sit and tal k to him almost every day -- not
every day, but almost.

Very frequently.

As he started

running into terrible problems, and as these problems
mounted, I became sort of a safe confidant for him to admit
the size and nature of some of his problems and his own
worries about being able to resolve some of the things that
he was coming up against, and use me as a sort of a sounding
board to try out ideas and so on.

In turn, I tried to give

him the help that I had given Magsaysay, responding by
summarizing what he had said, but in a form stressing the
principles involved and enumerating and the factors that
a man should look at and examine very closely in order to
make a decision.

By laying this out for him verbally, it

would help him clarify the issues in his mind, so that he
could then make a decision.
useful.

He apparently found this quite

This was the basis of our relationship.

Also, part of my advice at the time was to get Diem --
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a r a ther shy, retiring type of a person who was happiest
when he was secluded in his room or office or study, reading
books and documents and being a scholar, -- getting that
type of a person out into the provinces and streets talking
to enough people to get an idea from people from all walks
of life of what they were thinking and hoping and doing,
meeting them on a ground where he could be eye to eye with
them and they wouldn't be trying to satisfy a great leader
or something, but ~here they would be talking between
human beings.
So a lot of my early pushing at him was
pushing him into visits around the countrysid e and seeing
what was going on.
Fortunatel y, the people were hungry for Vietnamese
leadership at the time, and responded very enthusias tically
to his appearance s among them. As a matter of fact, he was
much more popular than any historian has ever given him
credit for being .
I have photograph s of him in those days,
and just taking a look at the crowds that came around and
the look of delight and sort of affection in their faces and
in their eyes as they met this man and talked to him, you
can tell that they were happy to see him. This, in turn,
meant a great deal to Diem and bouyed him up a bit, so that
he started enjoying getting out and talking to people,
and who wouldn't?

It's very flattering for a man to be
loved, and the people loved him, so as he became more and
more sure of himself. The more he was learning of what the
people really felt and what their needs were, they were
becoming more and more candid with him.
This remained largely true for the extent of my service
in Vietnam.
I left at the end of 1956. When I left, I
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,I

left a very popu lar Veitn ames e lead er runn
ing thin gs, a man
who was bein g very resp onsi ve to the need
s of the peop le.
I thou ght the show was on the road when I
left .
Thin gs did chan ge after ward s.
But he was a very like able
huma n bein g when I knew him in thos e year
s, and a man who
went throu gh some terr ible cris es of lead
ersh ip and oppo sitio n
and deci sion s that were very , very tryin g
in a huma n sens e,
that woul d have been tryin g on any lead er.
Anyb ody in that
spot woul d have sort of gone throu gh the
same fire that
Diem had to go throu gh.
He was hand ed trag ic, vast prob lems
that were enou gh to wrec k any huma n spir it,
but he had the
cour age and the inte grity to hand le the situ
atio n.
I came
to have grea t resp ect for him by watc hing
what was happ enin g
righ t clos e to him, and the way he met his
prob lems . We
becam e clos e pers onal frien ds.
\

Q:

But by 1963 it seem s that he had lost this
pers onal
touc h. My own obse rvati on ther e was that
he was a stran ger
in a pala ce, and unap proa chab le, and very
afra id peop le
surro unde d him in Saig on.
A:

Nati onal lead ersh ip and the powe r that goes
alon g with
it of cour se has corr upti ve elem ents in it.
Unle ss a pers on
is very , very awar e of corr upti ng influ ence
s at work , he
beco mes the victi m of his own powe r.
In Diem 's case , he
had a brot her who gath ered info rmat ion for
him, and init ially
I am talk ing abou t his brot her Nhu, his youn
ger brot her -the man had poli tica l orga niza tion s base d
in labo r unio ns
that had very accu rate, true info rmat ion
on the way that
labo r and some of the farm ers and farm unio
n orga niza tion s
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felt about things.

So this was very useful.

But again, I

think Nhu became corrupted by running an espionage net or
an intelligence net, and always figuring that he had the
latest inside word of what was going on. He became more
assertive as he gave this invorrnation to his brother, and
both of them started substituting the information that came
in to them from these nets for their personally going out
and finding out things first-hand.

Evidently they didn't

realize that this was putting up a sort of a glass wall
between themselves and the people. With it, they started
getting lost. They became in effect the tools, unwittingly
so, of the people supplying the information, who all too
often, seeing their own power, started aiming for their own
more and more selfish ends, telling them what the situation
was in terms benefiting self-interest, or even inventing
things just to keep the payments corning for supplying
information.
It was a very corrosive type of situation
a leader permitting himself to get separated from the
people. And Nhu was an intellectual . . I suspect that he
became convinced that he was the brightest guy that ever
came down the pike, and pretty soon talked himself into
thinking that he was brighter than his brother Diem, and
became a bit impatient with his brother on his brother's
caution over some moves and plans and started forcing his
own opinions on Diem more and more.
I last saw Diem in '61 (in the fall) and even at that
period he was a very different individual than the man I
had left in 1956. When we met in '61, it was the first
time that I can recall, ever, that his brother Nhu sat
with him while we were talking about very personal things,
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in sort of person al friends hip confide nce between ourselv es.
His brother Nhu would sometim es answer the questio ns that I
put to Diem, and I would have to explain and say, "I am
talking to your brothe r, not to you.
I asked Diem what
he though t." And Nhu kept supplyi ng the answer for his
brother and Diem would agree with him.
This was a strange relatio nship that I hadn't seen
before.
Just what had happene d there I don't know. But changes
are what you get sometim es when you go back and see old
friends after years of absence .
Then you start wonder ing,
"What's the guy been up to that he ever develop ed this way?
He is a differe nt person ." I just don't know.
By the time
of his overthr ow and death in '63, I t hink the change had
become set in concre te, and had probabl y gone much further
than anythin g I ever saw. From what people were telling me
about Diem in '63, he sounded like a strange r to me from
the man I knew. But what caused that, I really don't know.
Q:

About 1961, I guess, an organiz ation was formed, known
as Jungle Jim, which became the predec essor for the

develop ment of Air Force counter -insurg ency forces.
Could
you, sir, fill us in on the evoluti on of the separat e Air
Force units dedicat ed to counter -insurg ency?
A:

That came about during the Kennedy Admin istratio n, and
I would say that the true genesis of that as far as an
officia l act would be came from the Preside nt person ally,
that is Kennedy .
Kennedy had asked the Chiefs, in a meeting

with him to take action that would give him some capabi lity
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of handling unconventiona l warfare. Each of the Chiefs
responded somewhat differently. The Army already was ahead
of the game, by only a few months with their Special Forces.
The Special Forces originally had not been organized for
counter-insur gency, but had been a force intended to work
with guerrilla forces in support of regular forces in a
conventional war, (probably World War III).
Near the end of the Eisenhower Administratio n, some
of the Army Special Forces people had been encouraged by me
personally -- and some had come up and worked on my saff in
the Pentagon -- to take a more active role in counterinsurgency in an attempt to understand and to offer services
wherever the U.S. became involved. The Army at the time
had been very reluctant to approve a doctrine of that sort
their doctrines on this had been developed at Leavenworth,
and Leavenworth hadn't come up with an Army counterinsurgency doctrine.
down at Fort Bragg.

The doctrine was done very informally
Was it Bragg? Yes, where the Special

Forces Center is.
Q:

Yes.

(cross talk)

A:

It had been worked out by the Special Forces staff
there, partially by those that were on temporary duty in my
office in the Pentagon.
I encouraged some of the Cabinet

members and high ranking military in the Army to go down and
visit Bragg at the time. Officers at the center, bless
their hearts, had the courage to stand up in front of the
VIPs and give the doctrine that they were going to follow
from then on, which was hardly official. This was right at
the end of the Eisenhower Administratio n.

Lansd ale - 65

We got word of this over to the Presid ent-el ect, and
his task force, who were workin g on the proble ms of
govern ment, includ ing the milita ry and the defens e role and
things .
Kenned y person ally liked this one aspect very much,
and he picked it up and showed an intens e intere st almost
from the day he was inaugu rated.
So with the Army doing some things , he wanted the other
servic es to see what they could do.
The Marine Corps said
they had a very simple soluti on -- that all of the Marine
Corps was design ed to fight counte r-insu rgency , so the
Presid ent needn 't ask any of the other servic es to develo p
anythi ng, but to just turn the proble m over to the Marine
Corps and they'd take care of the whole thing for him. The
Presid ent said, "Thank you very much, but I still want the
servic es to develo p their capab ilities ." And with that each
of the Chiefs came back from the presid ential meetin g to the
Pentag on and went to work on the proble m, one of them
being LeMay.
Curt LeMay, as far as I know, was the impetu s or the
initia ting point within the Air Force itself for Jungle
Jim and for coming up with someth ing in respon se to the
Presid ent's regue st.
I know that I talked to him about it
at the period , and from the way he talked I had always
taken it for grante d that it was his own person al sort of
child, you might say, in the Air Force and that he was
intens ely intere sted in seeing it formed and be given a
chance in life.
I know in the fall of '61 he was very anxiou s to get
units into Vietna m to start workin g with the Vietna mese
Air Force, and start traini ng the Vietna mese Air Force.
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He had asked me when I went out there to get the agreem ent
of the Vietna mese Govern ment to invite the U.S. Air Force
to send in such a unit.
This was done, in the fall of '61,
when Ross Milton (Gener al T . R. Milton ) and I went to Vietna
m
with Maxwe ll Taylor and Walt Rostow .
I obtain ed the reques t
from Presid ent Diem and Ross Milton picked out their first
statio n, at Bien Hoa Air Base.
Q:

In 1962 -- the United States Air Force scheme for
keepin g paratr oops and the troop carrie r aircra ft on alert
as a centra l measu re in meetin g the insurg ency.
(Pause )
A:

What was the first part of that?

Q:

Keepin g paratr ooper s and troop carrie rs

A:

Well, I felt that having an elite group in the sense
of people traine d and screen ed for skills to meet the type
of minimu m effort for a maximu m effec t.that the U.S. could
exert in one of these situat ions, was a very wise action
for the U.S. milita ry to take.
I wasn' t entire ly certai n
that just design ating airbor ne units as a group to meet a
situat ion would prove a valuab le soluti on or an effect ive
soluti on to it, but having an Americ an unit able to get
into a positi on very qui ckly did make sense to me.
So I was person ally for such an action , althou gh with
the qualif icat ion that they had to be truly skille d in the
types of action s that would be asked of them.
I felt then and still do that this was a vital as
well as a major qualif icatio n.
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Q:

To what extent, sir, was the United States Air Force's
view of counter -insurg ency in Southe ast Asia clouded by
preoccu pations with modern hardwa re, air strike roles as
opposed to air lift -- and I'll come back to these one at
a time -- the inter-s ervice compet ition, and our experie nces
in World War II and Korea.
To get back to the first, were we too involve d with
trying to get the most modern hardwa re into the theater ?
A:

No, not really.

The first aircra ft being conside red
were actuall y close to being obsole te as far as what the
then modern Air Force was consid ering, and there was
conside rable express ion of though t, I know, by some of the
Air Force genera ls who were concern ed with these matters
up in the Air Staff, about keeping our equipm ent to a
nature of the means that the recipie nt country could afford
to have.

It meant that aircra ft would be either passing
out of the U.S. invento ry, or being less costly to mainta in,
or to man or to equip, or at least to keep flying.
I know that in the early days there was nowhere near
the love of gimmic kry and advance d ideas and develop ment
of new weapons and so forth that very shortly after became
fashion able.
Q:

Do you think we tended to concen trate too much on the
air strike roles as opposed to, let's say, air lift and psy
war operati ons?
A:

Perhaps so.

There was one elemen t of the Air Staff
working on this matter at the time, I know, and they used
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to talk to me.

Mind you, I wasn't a member of the Air
Staff at the time, but was on the Secretary of Defense's
Staff.
But in talking with some of the officers, I recall
some of their thinking, on examples selected by them from
past experiences.
The one that they mentioned again and
again was a British experience in what used to be called
Mesopotamia, in which the RAF allegedly had the major role
in keeping down dissidents by simple use of air power, by
both air strikes and threatened air strikes, and air patrols
by fighters and bombers over dissident-ruled areas.
Q:

That was against the Mad Mullah, wasn't it, or
something like that?

A:

Yes, yes.

Q:

In the desert.

A:

It's still a moot point among the British as to whether
the RAF accomplished that, or whether some of the political
types and some of the ground types who were involved in

negotiations and other matters didn't have as key a role
as the RAF.
But I knew that in the Air Staff, at the time
there was strong consideration given by some of the Staff
to the fact that air power properly used might very well
offer the major or the key factor in solving an insurgency,
if given the proper chance.

Q:

What was your reaction to this?
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A:

,.

I felt that air power had a part in it, but I had
made it very plain in my talks with the Air Staff people,
and then some of the early study groups that were trying to
work on these problem s for the Preside nt, that I felt that
a key factor in counter ing insurge ncy was to get native
leaders to the right places at the right times . Thus, the
main use of air power could be to give airlift to these
individ uals and bringin g them from their desk in the capital
city out to the field, getting them to the proper places
at the right time.
I felt this way not only about air
power, but also I was in opposi tion to the ground force
type of weapon such as artille ry
agains t anythin g that
wouldn 't have a person al contac t with the enemy, but might
be easily subjec t to misuse.
Q:

Do you think we also leaned upon the experie nce s of
World War II and Korea as a guide to our actions , or did
we sort of try and learn everyth ing all over again from the
beginni ng?
A:

Well, there were some World War II experie nces that
were cranked into this, particu larly by some of the folks
who had operate d either in the African desert or in the
Middle East, and those who had been in the China-B urma
theater , who had been in on the "hump" flights or had
tried to work air suppor t mission s for the Chindi ts, for
Merril l's maraud ers, and other unconv entiona l forces on
our side operati ng agains t the Japanes e in Burma. But
I really am not an author ity on what the thinkin g was inside
the Air Force and on what was being brough t to bear at
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tha t tim e, sin ce I wa s a
ste p rem ove d fro m the Ai
r Sta ff in
my wo rk for the Se cre tar
y of De fen se, and on ly use
d to lea rn
the se thi ng s thr ou gh inf orm
al ses sio ns wi th som e of
the
off ice rs inv olv ed in my
off ice .
I wa s try ing to enc our age
a lot of thi nk ing by the
Ai r
Fo rce and the oth er ser vic
es on thi s su bje ct, and
wa s
mo stl y pus hin g the m to rel
y on ver y com mon sen se,
les s
fla mb oya nt sol uti on s to
som e of the pro ble ms .

l•

'

Q:

Si r, cou ld you tel l us som
eth ing abo ut Ai r Fo rce civ
ic
act ion ac tiv iti es in Vie
tna m fro m the ear ly day s
of you r
inv olv em ent un til you cea
sed to be cu rre nt wi th the
sce ne?
A:

I kno w ver y lit tle abo ut
the ear ly day s of Ai r Fo
rce
civ ic act ion .
I do n't rec all eve r dis cu
ssi ng the sub jec t
wi th any Ai r Fo rce off ice
rs.
I mi ght po ssi bly hav e fro
m
som e of tho se who wo uld
hav e vis ite d me in the Pen
tag on, bu t
the peo ple who ask ed me
to tal k abo ut civ ic act ion
we re the
Arm y and the Ma rin e Co rps
.
I do n't rec all any suc h
req ue st
eve r fro m the Ai r Fo rce
un til ma ny, ma ny yea rs lat
er, wh en
I wa s a civ ili an in the
Em bas sy in Sai gon . Alo ng
abo ut
196 7 the Ai r Fo rce civ ic
act ion peo ple in Vie tna m
we re hav ing
a me eti ng in Sai gon and
ask ed me to sit in wi th
the m one
aft ern oo n, wh ich I did .
I wa s a lit tle sur pri sed
the n tha t
the Ai r Fo rce wa s tha t int
ere ste d in the sub jec t,
as I had
kno wn ver y lit tle abo ut
it be for e the n.
Q:

Si r, on som eth ing 180 ou
t fro m civ ic act ion , wh at
we re
you r fee lin gs onc e we beg
an ou r bom bin g cam pai gn
in No rth
Vie tna m?
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A:

I was initially quite opposed to the bombing, since it

broke almost every rule that I knew of for success in a
political war which was being undertaken in Vietnam at the
time.
I expr essed myself rather plainly on this at that
time to some of our top U.S. officials in the Administration,
by pointing out the advantages -- politically -- that it gave
an enemy who had been having trouble with the people up to
that point. As with the Luftwaffe attacks in Britain, it
permitted Ho Chi Minh and some other smart political leaders
in Hanoi to do a Winston Churchill and prove that an enemy
was attacking them and therefore the people must hold
together and unify and defy this enemy.
So, in effect, we
were doing something that would look good from our rules of
warfare, but in terms of the actual war that was being conducted
in Vietnam, we were letting the aggressors and our enemies
take full political and psychological advantage of someth ing .
We gave them a very priceless way of maintaining and
strengthening their leadership at the very time when we
wanted it weakened.
So I think that any move that would
make leaders strong at the time we are fighting them,
certainly isn't a very wise move.
I don't think that the
advantage that was talked of at the time -- that we would
give a boost in morale to the South Vietnamese -- was worth
the price, and certainly the bomb damage that was wreaked
on North Vietnam was hardly worth the price to arouse a
whole nation to oppose us and to actually get the energy
and the will to want to see our defeat, which was the real
cost of that attack.

Q:

Now we've entered a period of withdrawal from Vietnam.
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How do you see in the final scenari o the resolut ion of
America n involve ment in Vietnam ?

A:

I think that we are going to have a slow erosion of U.S.
involve ment, that is going to have to take place over the
years, instead of the very brief period now being talked
about in Congre ss and in the press and by demons trators;
we might well get out of a combat role and stay on in an
advisor y and suppor t role; we might even get out of an air
combat role and still stay in an air suppor t (role), meaning
transpo rt role, for a long time, but there will be some sort
of America n presenc e in Vietnam that will have elemen ts of
militar y and econom ic assista nce of some sort for a very
long period.
As the Vietnam ese awaken to the fact that they have to
stand on their own feet, and take care of their own problem s,
there will be a very healthy series of growth actions coming
out of that, in which the more they are forced to do, the
more they will learn that they can do. They will become
aware of their own capabi lities, and thus able to carry out
things.
So I think we might well wind up with more America n
personn el and help in Vietnam than the situati on will need,
say a year or two years from now, if presen t develop ments
continu e the way they do, and if the politic al scene keeps
develop ing in Vietnam the way we hope it will. That is, if
the Vietnam ese electio ns for Preside nt and for Congre ss
this year are carried out in a way so that the Vietnam ese
people themse lves will feel that they have elected a
leaders hip that truly represe nts them, and are people that
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they want as leaders. Then I think many other factors in
the war will start changing favorabl y towards us, and, as
we pull out troops, we will discover that the Vietname se
are demonst rating far more capabili ty in handling their
own affairs than any of the American s can really apprecia te
in their sort of projecti ons for the future today.
If
there is cheating and a bad scene in the election s in
Vietnam this year, I think that in the almost immediat e
future -- say a year or two years from now -- they will
find tremendo us politica l dissatis faction on our side in
Vietnam , and a very good chance that there will be more
coup attempts or other very unsettli ng, unstable events
taking place in Vietnam that can only assist the present
enemy.
This will lead to problems where we should have
American s in helping, but the American s couldn' t help, and
would not be permitte d to by public opinion here at home .
It will be too strong for a Presiden t or for a Congress or
for any executiv e departme nt to give aid then, so -- what
I have just said is really continge nt on the politica l
factors.
They are really the main feature on the horizon
for the immediat e future in Vietnam, far more than the
actions that took place in Laos or Cambodia , or any of the
other actions that so much public attentio n has been on.
Q:

Thank you very much , sir.

End of Interview .

